Context: In contrast to the Affordable Care Act, some have suggested the opioid epidemic represents an area of bipartisanship. This raises an important question: to what extent are Democrat-led and Republican-led states different or similar in their policy responses to the opioid epidemic? Methods: Three main methodological approaches were used to assess state-level policy responses to the opioid epidemic: a legislative analysis across all 50 states, an online survey of 50 state (and DC) Medicaid agencies, and in-depth case studies with policy stakeholders in five states. Findings: Conservative states pursue hidden and targeted Medicaid expansions, and a number of legislative initiatives, to address the opioid crisis. However, the total fiscal commitment among these Republican-led states pales in comparison to states that adopt the Medicaid expansion. Because the state legislative initiatives do not provide treatment, their actions are not the same, and these states spend substantially less than states with Democratic control. Conclusions: Rather than persistently working to retrench all programs, conservatives have relied on policy designs that emphasize devolution, fragmentation, and inequality to both expand and retrench benefits. This strategy, which allocates benefits differentially to different social groups and obfuscates responsibility, allows conservatives to avoid political blame typically associated with retrenchment.
One of the most notable political aspects of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) is the extreme partisanship that accompanied both its enactment and the postenactment period. Not one Republican voted for the ACA, and their high level of opposition to the bill was sustained from when it was passed in 2010 through 2017 (Hacker and Pierson 2018; Patashnik and Oberlander 2018) . Immediately after the bill passed, 23 Republican-led states joined a lawsuit challenging the individual mandate and claiming that the Medicaid expansion represented federal coercion and unduly restricted states'rights. While the Supreme Court upheld the individual mandate, it ruled in favor of the states' claim about Medicaid. As a result, the federal government could allow states to adopt the Medicaid expansion but not mandate it (Grogan 2014; Rosenbaum 2012 ; see also Grogan and Jacobson 2013) . States' embrace or rejection of the Medicaid expansion exemplified the political polarization around the ACA. Initially, all of the Democrat-led states adopted the Medicaid expansion, and almost all Republican-led states refused it.
At the same time, the opioid epidemic was growing in nearly every state across the country. Opioid overdose deaths quadrupled from 1999 to 2015 and accounted for almost all of the increase in overdose deaths over the past decade (O'Donnell, Gladden and Seth 2017; Rudd et al. 2016; Scholl et al. 2018) . The societal and economic costs also continued to grow: from 2001 to 2017, the opioid epidemic cost more than $1 trillion, including costs related to lost productivity, tax revenue, health care, social services, education, and criminal justice (Altarum 2018; Segel et al. 2019) . Opioid overdose deaths outnumber automobile fatalities nationally, and substantially exceed the annual death toll from AIDS at the peak of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
Given the overwhelming impact of the opioid epidemic, it is not surprising that the US public believes the government should act to address it. Over two-thirds (69%) of the public believe opioid misuse is a serious (47%) or somewhat serious (22%) problem in their state (Politico/Harvard School of Public Health Poll, July 2018). While Republicans and Democrats both report concern about the problem, there are some partisan differences in beliefs about whether government should respond and how. When asked which entity should have the greatest responsibility for regulating addiction treatment, the vast majority (77%) said government. Yet, when asked whether spending should be increased for the federal government to deal with the opioid epidemic, 52% of Democrats supported more spending, compared with only 38% of Republicans and 30% of Independents (Johnson 2017) . Most Republicans favor state government action over federal, with 44% believing it should be state government.
However, the severity of the opioid epidemic appears to influence public opinion regarding the role of federal government in responding to it. Fully 55% of respondents who live in states with opioid-related mortality rates exceeding 20 per 100,000 persons support more federal spending on the crisis (Johnson 2017) . This is an important distinction because many states with Republican Party control have higher per capita opioid death rates (Goodwin et al. 2018) . While some Republican constituencies may not want the federal government to act, the majority-especially in high-need states-want state government action to curb the opioid epidemic.
It is also clear that politicians are feeling pressure to respond to this issue. During the 2018 campaigns, politicians in competitive races used emotional pleas about opioid use disorder (OUD) and misuse to woo voters. In states like Wisconsin, where hundreds of people are dying of opioid overdoses every year, candidates from both parties were talking about drugs in stump speeches, on Facebook, and in ads using startlingly similar language. Some suggest the opioid epidemic represents an area of bipartisanship where members of both parties have found broad areas of agreement (Smith 2018) .
This raises an important question, which we seek to address in this article: to what extent are Democrat-led and Republican-led states different or similar in their policy responses to the opioid epidemic? To address this question, we use three data sources: in-depth interviews with stakeholders in five Republican-led states, a survey of 50 state Medicaid agencies to document substance use disorder coverage policy, and proposed and enacted legislation to address the opioid epidemic from 50 state legislatures. Our findings suggest that Republican-led states are indeed feeling significant pressure to respond to the opioid epidemic, and are in some cases taking significant steps to address it. Three of our five case study states indicate that the epidemic was a major driving force that led their states to adopt the Medicaid expansion. Because the Medicaid expansion was completely off the table in two of our case study states, while demand for state action to address the opioid epidemic was similarly intense, these states pursued less-prominent and more-targeted policy approaches in their regular Medicaid programs, and a number of state-level legislative initiatives. Our 50-state survey data corroborated that Republican-led states rely on Medicaid to provide benefits for substance use disorder (SUD). States with total Republican control also passed more legislation to address the opioid epidemic and devoted a higher proportion of state resources to these legislative initiatives than Democrat-led states.
Nonetheless, the total fiscal commitment to address the opioid epidemic among these Republican-led states pales in comparison to states that adopted the Medicaid expansion. Because non-expansion legislative initiatives tend to focus on regulation or raising awareness, these Republicanled actions are more modest than those implemented by states with Democratic control. Because Republicans have not come up with a non-Medicaid policy to expand treatment to address the epidemic, they overall spend substantially less, and leave thousands of people with OUD without access to treatment in their state. Given this reality, it is logical to ask, How can Republicans in these states pursue a policy that denies access to treatment for a core part of their base without political consequences? Partisanship, Retrenchment, and the Opioid Epidemic Political polarization in the US has recently been described as asymmetrical because the Republican Party has moved further to the right over time, while Democrats have remained ideologically in place (Bonica 2013; Pierson 2015, 2018; Mann and Ornstein 2013; Skocpol and Jacobs 2011) . As Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson (2018: 560) note, this movement to the right "can be seen in roll-call votes in Congress, in the positions of presidents and vice presidents, [and] in ideological divisions on the Supreme Court." Under asymmetrical polarization, Republicans have been more willing to pursue retrenchment policies even when their own voter base is against it, such as with their most recent attempt to repeal the ACA in 2017. Indeed, as Republicans were attempting to repeal the ACA, one of the key arguments against it-even among members in their own party-was the impact repeal would have on the opioid epidemic. As Medicaid has expanded over time, even in conservative states, and the Republican Party's core constituents include working-class voters, who ironically rely on the program for a vital source of financial protection and access to care, a sizable portion of their base was against repeal and the significant cuts proposed to Medicaid (Grogan and Park 2018; Hacker and Pierson 2018) . Why were Republicans in Washington seemingly unconcerned about a potential backlash among their base? Hacker and Pierson (2018) offer three reasons. First, in 2017, Republicans had a majority in the House and Senate, and believed this gave them a substantial electoral cushion. Second, Republicans used negative partisanship strategies to encourage their base to be driven more by distrust or fear of the other party than by love of their policies. And finally, "Republicans designed their health care bills in ways that aimed to minimize the degree to which voters might mobilize against them. Particularly important was their reliance on the devolution of policy responsibility to the states; . . . strategic policy engineering was meant to provide 'backlash insurance' . . .
[to] insulate the party from significant electoral fallout" (562-63).
Yet, if Republican-controlled states focus on retrenchment, how do they avoid political costs associated with cutting popular programs? We argue that the structure of the program allows Republicans to strategically use the program to achieve their own policy objectives while avoiding blame. Because Medicaid is entrenched as a devolved, fragmented, and unequal program, federal-level Republicans fight to continue to keep the program as a devolved, fragmented, and unequal program, while state-level Republicans' oppositional strategy includes targeted retrenchment and expansion. While Democrats attempt to entrench a liberal version of the welfare state, Republicans pursue strategies to not only resist liberal policies but also embrace a conservative version of the welfare state.
This insight helps explain how conservative policy makers can run a retrenchment, antigovernment campaign at the federal level seemingly without electoral costs, because they can use conservatively designed programs at the state-level such as Medicaid that are devolved, fragmented, and unequal to strategically expand and retract. In addition to employing a negative partisanship frame, we argue that Republicans also use discourse that aligns with their conservative policy designs-devolution, fragmentation, and inequity-to frame expansions targeted to their base as deserving, and retrenchments targeted to those who oppose them as undeserving.
The politics surrounding the opioid epidemic reveals the conservative welfare state strategy in action. When Congress passed the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act (CARA) and 21st Century Cures Act in 2016 and the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities (SUPPORT) Act in 2018, it allows states to reject the Medicaid expansion to solve the opioid crisis and instead (ironically given their stance of accepting federal funding) to draw down federal funds to specifically target the opioid epidemic. CARA authorized many harm-reduction strategies, including increased access to the opioid overdose reversal drug, naloxone. The 21st Century Cures Act designated $1 billion in grants for states over two years to fight the opioid epidemic. The money can be used to make SUD treatment programs more accessible, to improve the quality of the SUD workforce, and to research the most effective approaches to prevent addiction.
The SUPPORT Act offers a range of strategies for addressing the epidemic, including targeting improvements in Medicaid and Medicare programs, expanding access to opioid and nonopioid treatment options and provider capacity, 1 improving oversight over opioid prescribing through increased data sharing, removing barriers to maintenance of coverage for special populations (e.g., pregnant women, infants, and children), expanding use of telehealth, and incorporating housing and other recovery support services in SUD treatment. These programs allow Republicans at the federal level to attempt to avoid blame aimed at Medicaid retrenchment by pointing to these targeted solutions to problems their base cares deeply about. They also allow Republicans to devolve responsibility to the states. We turn now to our methods and then findings to show how states pursue a targeted strategy of expansion and retrenchment to respond to their base and avoid blame for not doing more.
Methods
Three main methodological approaches were used to assess state-level policy responses to the opioid epidemic: a legislative analysis across all 50 states, an online survey of 50 state Medicaid agencies, and in-depth case studies with policy stakeholders in 5 states. Because the Republican Party platform and the majority of Republican constituents explicitly indicated they do not approve of federal action to address the opioid epidemic, but do favor state action, we used states as the unit of analysis, instead of parties or legislators, to see if Republican-led states are indeed acting to address the opioid crisis and, if so, how?
National Analysis of Legislative Action
To understand legislative action across all states, we created a unique dataset of all introduced state legislation related to opioids and the opioid epidemic. The database was created from keyword searches related to the opioid epidemic through LexisNexis databases on state legislation from 2014 through 2018. All legislation was initially scanned to determine if it was related to the opioid epidemic, with unrelated bills excluded from the remainder of the analysis. From the remaining bills that were introduced, the following data was collected: state, year of introduction, whether the legislation was enacted, the legislation sponsor's political party affiliation, the partisan breakdown of floor votes from each chamber, and the type of legislation (regulation, education/public awareness, or treatment).
The coding of this information involved two researchers. To develop the coding scheme of the intention of the legislation, a subset of opioid legislation was selected across different years and states. Using open coding techniques, two researchers read through 100 pieces of legislation and devised an initial coding scheme to catalog the type of legislation. After the coding scheme was developed, the two researchers independently read through an additional 200 pieces of legislation and compared their results. The coders agreed on 85% of the coding, with the remaining discrepancies discussed and adjudicated, adding additional detail to the codebook as well as four additional codes. A single researcher then finished coding the remaining legislation.
Survey of Medicaid Benefit Coverage Policies
To gather data on state Medicaid coverage of SUD treatments that could be used to address the opioid crisis, we conducted a 15-minute, internetbased survey of Medicaid programs in the 50 states. The University of Chicago Survey Lab conducted the survey from May to December in 2017. State Medicaid directors were mailed a packet that contained a description of the study, an invitation to participate, and a request to designate a knowledgeable staff person to fill out the survey. To encourage participation, the survey lab followed up by phone and email with directors who did not respond. Forty-seven Medicaid programs responded, for a 92% response rate. For the three states that did not complete the survey, a research team member added data from an earlier 2014 wave of the survey and verified these data from a review of publicly available resources on state Medicaid coverage for addiction treatment. As a result, the final study data included the total population of the Medicaid programs in all 50 states. Medication data were collected through a review of published state drug formularies using the method employed by the American Society of Addiction Medicine to collect data in 2014.
State Case Studies
To provide more granular analysis, case studies were conducted in five states. Using purposive sampling, state selection was based on four criteria. First, we identified states with high salience of drug and alcohol issues, as measured by national media and state political attention (17 states). We drew from four national newspapers with high readership-the New York Times, the Washington Post, USA Today, and the Wall Street Journal. We identified national-level articles' coverage of state-specific prescription- States were ranked based on the extent of media attention garnered and political attention on substance use issues. States with higher salience were more likely to be chosen as a case site.
Second, we identified states based on whether or not a state had expanded Medicaid. We wanted to ensure that at least half of our sample states had chosen to expand their Medicaid program and include ones that expanded at different times. Third, we wanted to have a mix of states that established their own state health insurance exchanges and states that opted to use the federally facilitated platform. Fourth, to ensure geographic variation, we selected states to include all regions in the United States.
Because this study is particularly interested in shedding light on how Republican-led states have responded to the opioid epidemic, we focus on data from five of the eight states selected that at the time of our study represented total Republican Party control (Ohio, Florida, and Georgia) or ideologically conservative states with divided party control (Kentucky and New Hampshire).
Stakeholder Selection
To capture a comprehensive understanding of states' responses to the opioid epidemic and health policy reform, our recruitment strategy targeted a range of stakeholders in each state using a nonprobabilistic snowball sampling approach to understand the perspectives of diverse political actors (Weiss 1995) . Expert interviews targeted stakeholders directly involved in the policy-making process to better understand goal conflicts and technical disputes and to account for the role of multiple actors within the policy community (Sabatier and Weible 2007) .
In-depth interviews were conducted via telephone and audio-recorded, with each interview lasting approximately one hour (ranging from 40 to 75 minutes). All interviews were conducted by the study team lead interviewer, accompanied by co-investigators designated by state. Prior to the start of each interview, verbal informed consent was obtained from each participant.
We use the qualitative data to first show how the opioid epidemic was a crucial driver pushing three of our states to adopt the Medicaid expansion, and, second, to shed light on our 50-state Medicaid survey data and state legislative data.
Findings: Front-Stage Retrenchment Politics with Exceptions: The Opioid Epidemic and the Medicaid Expansion
The most notable difference in how states address the opioid epidemic relates to whether states adopt the ACA Medicaid expansion. Strong evidence shows that partisan politics plays a large role in explaining which states adopt the Medicaid expansion, with Democrat-controlled states adopting and Republican-controlled states opting out (Barrilleaux and Rainey 2014; Grogan and Park 2017; Lanford and Quadagno 2016) . As of 2017, when we conducted the interviews, 32 states including the District of Columbia had adopted the Medicaid expansion (KFF n.d.) . Of the 19 states that opted out, 16 were under total Republican control and the remaining 3 were under mixed control.
Although partisanship is the main driver in determining which states adopt the expansion, there were some exceptions: 9 states under total Republican control and 16 states under mixed control adopted the expansion.
Scholars have written about the politics in several conservative states leading to passage of the Medicaid expansion (Grogan, Singer, and Jones 2017; Kliff 2016 Kliff , 2017 , but none has mentioned the role of the opioid epidemic in nudging states toward Medicaid expansion. Our qualitative data suggests that the crisis played an important role in moving three of our five states toward adopting the Medicaid expansion. For example, Ohio is a Republican controlled state, but passed the Medicaid expansion. Mixed party control existed in Kentucky and New Hampshire when these states passed the Medicaid expansion, but in 2016 both switched to total Republican control. Ohio, New Hampshire, and Kentucky rank second, third, and seventh, respectively, in opioid mortality.
All the stakeholders in these states emphasized the personal nature of the opioid epidemic and the direct impact of overdose deaths on the families and local communities of policy makers who are making key health policy decisions. In Kentucky, a state agency representative mentioned that because 1 in 3 "Kentuckians say they know somebody with a substance use disorder," it means that for a lot more people the issue has "a human face" and is personal (KY stakeholder no. 6). In New Hampshire, a Managed Care Organization (MCO) representative noted the pressure put on the state legislature by "a large vocal group of leaders and stakeholders" who demanded "a robust response to the opioid epidemic" (NH stakeholder no. 8). An Ohio state agency representative mentioned how important it was that the political pressure "crossed all socioeconomic layers, [and] brought people to the table" that normally didn't talk to one another. This same representative mentioned that this was a huge shift from just a few years prior, when there was "virtually no investment in this area" (OH stakeholder no. 1).
The urgent nature of the opioid epidemic also fostered a shift in ideological views on how SUD should be addressed. A provider representative in Kentucky said that in the past most thought, "You're a bad person if you're addicted." Because of this mindset, the state supported a punitive approach. However, today, the view is dramatically different with many conservative legislators supporting harm reduction practices. "We went from over a 10-year [stigmatizing] period, to passing legislation that included needle exchange" and a much broader "acceptance of medicationassisted treatment" (KY stakeholder no. 3). An Ohio MCO representative noted that "the vast majority of folks [now view] substance abuse as an illness" as opposed to a behavioral problem, and believe it should "be treated medically" (OH stakeholder no. 2).
Perhaps surprisingly, stakeholders in these Republican-led states discussed how it was viewed as irresponsible not to adopt the Medicaid expansion in light of the severity of the epidemic. Because "people are dying" and Medicaid is "one, if not the biggest funders for treating that issue, we can't afford frankly to not pay for services that work for people" (OH stakeholder no. 5, state agency representative). Some noted that the seriousness of the opioid epidemic pushed even some of the most conservative legislators toward accepting the Medicaid expansion. An MCO representative said, "The guys in Ohio . . . that frankly ran and won, on the very, very right side of John Boehner, still support substance abuse and opioid treatment" (OH stakeholder no. 2). They primarily wanted to support treatment for OUD, but realized that the Medicaid expansion was the easiest way to do that.
Although these conservative states were pushed to adopt the Medicaid expansion, they also experienced cross-pressures from the network of contributors and organizations associated with Charles Koch and recently deceased David Koch (Mayer 2017; Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016) . These groups have enormous financial heft and have fought vigorously against state efforts to pass the Medicaid expansion (Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016) . However, they are also active in fighting for conservative policy designs such as work requirements, and instituting copayment requirements on low-income Medicaid enrollees. This pressure was on full display in Kentucky when the newly elected Republican Governor Bevin wanted to overturn the Medicaid Expansion adopted under the previous Democratic governor. Because we conducted our interviews shortly after the election, respondents from Kentucky offered some important insights on the politics of the opioid epidemic in relation to the Medicaid program in their conservative state, which had moved to total Republican control. Several respondents described a fragmented Medicaid program under which the state could impose work requirements and, at the same time, embrace the program to address the opioid epidemic.
He's pushing through a waiver that would allow him to do two things. One, he wants to charge at least like $10 a month as kind of a fee to Medicaid recipients and, two, he wants Medicaid recipients to show evidence of having gone back to work in order to retain their insurance . . . [since] we've got a Republican governor, a Republican Senate, and Republican House in this state right now; I don't really envision him having trouble getting that waiver through. He also wants to roll back the expansion but I don't think that's going to prove to be possible. (KY stakeholder no. 2, evaluation/research representative)
The majority of Republican voters in Kentucky and across the country support adopting the Medicaid expansion and, at the same time, conservative Medicaid policies such as copays and work requirements (Scott 2018) . Some describe this as yet another paradox in US public opinion, but it is important to see the strategic Republican policy engineering reflected in holding these two views simultaneously.
The expand and retrench strategy among Republicans in Kentucky was described perfectly by stakeholders in the state. On the one level "Governor Bevin and his administration [will] need to provide treatment, [because] nobody is going to come out and say that they're against substance use treatment and everybody is moved by the stories of people dying." However, "at another level there's a lot of misgivings about government funding of services for [some] people" (KY stakeholder no. 8, Medicaid MCO representative). Republicans use Medicaid to address the opioid epidemic to appease their base, and use Medicaid to enact punitive policies targeted at groups deemed to be undeserving and most likely to vote for the Democratic party-"self-respecting people want the opportunity to work," said Governor Bevin.
By pursuing these conservative policy designs in their Medicaid programs, Kentucky and other Republican-led states used these conservative innovations (NH, IN, AR, and PA all pursued Medicaid waivers to adopt the Medicaid expansion with conservative policy designs [Grogan, Singer, and Jones, 2017] ) to claim that their state was not adopting a federal government-run Medicaid program but their own private state version-despite drawing down more public funds than ever before. This is the strategic marketing that they hope will allow them to avoid blame from Tea Party groups who reject Medicaid.
Backstage Hidden Politics, Targeted Strategies: Medicaid Coverage Policy
Because states can leverage federal funds when they provide SUD treatment through Medicaid, utilizing the Medicaid program to finance SUD treatment is another important approach to address the opioid epidemic (NIDA 2016) . It is also useful politically to Republican-led states that have openly rejected the Medicaid expansion, because coverage policy is largely hidden from public view.
The partisan politics of coverage policy is very different from the politics of the Medicaid expansion. While the Medicaid expansion is a highly salient political issue, coverage policy is characterized by pressure group politics where provider groups and advocates are very aware and pressure state legislators to expand benefits, but the general public is unaware (Grogan 1994; Miller et al. 2012 ). This hidden politics allows Republicans to expand coverage under Medicaid to target the needs of their base and of other key patient and provider stakeholders, without suffering any political repercussions from using a program they otherwise condemn.
Our 50-state survey of SUD benefit coverage reveals that although states with total Republican control are less likely to cover SUD benefits than other states with some Democratic representation, the percent of these states utilizing Medicaid to cover SUD benefits-especially individual, group, and intensive out-patient and detoxification services-is quite high in light of their professed disdain for the program (see table 1).
It is important to point out the political context behind specific SUD treatments. First, methadone treatment has always been politically controversial. As a salient issue, it does not fit the usual "hidden politics" associated with coverage policy described above. This partisan divide is evident when we observe methadone coverage by state party control with only 64% of states with total Republican control covering methadone under Medicaid. While methadone coverage appears to reflect partisan divides, the acceptance of other medications for OUD treatment among conservative states is remarkable and illustrates how states are using Medicaid coverage policy to implement targeted expansions for their own objectives and stakeholders.
A Medicaid MCO representative from Georgia mentioned this shift in policy makers' thinking about addiction and those who suffer from it. "There's a framework shift happening in Georgia that . . . is moving us away from a punitive model related to substance use disorder, into a treatment focused . . . modality" (GA stakeholder no. 7). This framework shift in response to the opioid crisis is similar to that described above in Republican-led states that adopted the Medicaid expansion. What makes the ideological shift significant is that it happened at the same time that the state was openly rejecting the ACA Medicaid expansion. Indeed, according to our respondents, state policy makers were extremely resistant to anyone in state government even discussing the ACA or the Medicaid expansion. Georgia enacted the Georgia Health Care Freedom Act (HB 943), which forbids state government agencies from accepting or utilizing funding to advocate for any changes related to the ACA (Georgia State University Law Review 2014). Georgia stakeholders told us they were not allowed to mention the ACA or the Medicaid expansion in policy reports.
Given this, one might presume that Georgia would have been resistant to any Medicaid-related approaches to address the opioid epidemic. However, several respondents mentioned the broad range of SUD services that Medicaid covers in their state, and described continued efforts to expand services within Georgia's regular Medicaid program. A state agency representative mentioned that "if anything has Medicaid in front of it, we can't do it. That being said, very interestingly, we have extraordinary gubernatorial support on addiction, [and] he talks about people whose lives have really been turned around from treatment" (GA stakeholder no. 3). As a result, there is significant support for "addiction support services, drug [MAT] treatment, and community-based behavioral health services to be implemented [under Medicaid]" (GA stakeholder no. 3). What the stakeholders in Georgia described was a governor who eschews Medicaid when speaking to the public, but encourages state agencies to use Medicaid behind the scenes to cover medication-assisted treatment and other services to address the opioid epidemic. It is "that kind of the environment-mired in different and competing interests-" [that makes it] "very difficult to articulate" [what our] "priorities are" (GA stakeholder no. 3). And, that is the point of the strategy to keep it fragmented, diffuse, and confusing.
Although Florida did not adopt the ACA Medicaid expansion, the topic of Medicaid was not as politically sensitive as was described in Georgia.
Several respondents mentioned Senate Bill 12, which passed in April of 2016, as a major initiative to address behavioral health services generally, as well as the opioid epidemic. Florida's bill focused on improving the capacity of behavioral health providers by modifying licensure requirements making it possible to create a single, consolidated license to provide both mental health and substance use disorder services, and to create a coordinated system of care (Florida CS/SB 12 -Mental Health and Substance Abuse Act, 2016).
While these aspects of the bill relied on state-only resources, it is significant that the legislation included the directive to the state Medicaid and Behavioral Health agencies to maximize federal Medicaid funding to cover services for behavioral health treatments. As a result, although several stakeholders mentioned SB12, respondents focused more on the importance of Medicaid maximization policies for addressing the opioid epidemic. "One of the things that we're mostly committed to . . . is really expanding access to Medicaid services for treatment" (FL stakeholder no. 1, state agency representative). A provider representative also described "this push to do revenue max. To use state money to draw down more Medicaid to serve more people in the mental health/substance abuse system" (FL stakeholder no. 5, provider representative).
The targeted expand/retrench strategy also seems to have been written into SB12. As a state agency representative explained, state agencies are required to write a report to (1) identify the population it intends to target and whether the state should (or can) expand eligibility in any way, (2) define coverage policy for the target, and (3) specify a process and a plan for how the state would be able to meet the needs specified through revenue maximization (FL stakeholder no. 6). And, they definitely view persons with OUD-and providers who serve this population-as a target for expansion. "We are looking at our appropriations to reallocate some of our funding to make sure that we direct more funding to the treatment of those [with OUD] who need medication-assisted treatment" (FL stakeholder no. 7, state agency representative). Another important pattern among state party control and Medicaid SUD coverage policy emerges with residential treatment. Under Section 1905(a)(B) of the Social Security Act (the Institution for Mental Diseases exclusion), the federal government did not allow financial support for Medicaid coverage of SUD residential treatment. However, just in the last couple years, states can apply for a waiver to cover residential services in large part to address demand for such services among SUD providers and those suffering from OUD. This is a major commitment from the federal government and any state that takes up the benefit, because residential treatment is very expensive. Given the Republican Party's commitment to lowering taxes, it is perhaps not surprising that states under total Republic control have been less eager than states under Democrat control to offer the benefit (see table 1 ). Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that more than half (14) of the states with total Republican control cover this expensive benefit in their Medicaid programs to target the opioid crisis. Florida, for example, submitted a Medicaid waiver to the federal government specifically to expand Medicaid covered SUD residential treatment services, and also focused on building SUD provider participation in the Medicaid program.
State coverage of recovery support services also reveals an important pattern. Recovery support is a relatively new Medicaid covered service enacted in response to the opioid epidemic. The federal government allows states to cover the service with a federal financial match. This is the one SUD benefit in which states under total Republican control are more likely than Democrat-controlled states to provide coverage under Medicaid (see table 1 ).
Several reasons may help to account for this. First, recovery support services include a range of nonclinical services that may address the individual's environment, such as supportive housing or employment, and/ or provide emotional and practical support to maintain remission. The latter services typically include peer support, such as individual mentoring or peer-led support groups. Although the federal government will pay for the range of recovery support services, most states only pay for peer supports (McMullen 2019). While housing and employment supports are costly, payments for peer support are relatively modest.
Second, peer-led recovery support services can also be conceptualized as a service that promotes individual behavioral modification and personal responsibility and can be structured as a faith-based program, which fits well with a conservative ideology and has been heavily emphasized in conservative policy designs adopted by Republican-led states (Grogan, Singer, and Jones 2017) . This kind of individual-based ideology can be seen in Georgia's Recovery Transformation Program, a major initiative that utilizes persons who have experience with addiction as peer workers (or peer coaches) to help people with OUD.
Recovery transformation means that the State Department of Behavioral
Health [has] really embraced a concept that recovery starts from a position of a client themselves; . . . recovery services . . . up until recently, was top down. A client would come into our system and . . . be handed over to a therapist, who then gave instruction to a client. Now, we're trying to . . . deliver person-centered recovery services with a big emphasis on peers. That has really happened over the last two to three years." (GA Stakeholder NO. 4, provider representative) The recovery transformation project is also viewed as a method for developing workforce capacity in Georgia. "This is a workforce development initiative for us," [the director of the state agency] "wanted a peer workforce" (GA stakeholder no. 2, recovery policy advocate). It is important to see how conservative ideology fits with this preference for peerdelivered recovery support services: it encourages an individual responsibility frame, and relying on a peer workforce is relatively inexpensive and can also be used to delegitimize formal SUD services, especially those that rely heavily on government funding. Within the context of Medicaid expansion and other health care policy reforms, peer-delivered recovery support services are also covered in liberal states, but are often considered as part of a comprehensive continuum of care, complementary to formal SUD treatment (Bersamira 2018) . In contrast, when Republican-led states conceptualized peer support as individual responsibility, it can be considered as in alignment with other conservative policy designs, such as incentives for healthy lifestyles.
Symbolic Politics: State Opioid-Related Legislation
We turn now to analyze what type of opioid-related legislation states have proposed and enacted, and whether there are differences by state party control. Between 2014 and 2018, 1,804 pieces of legislation related to opioids were introduced across all 50 states. Given the severity of the opioid epidemic, legislatures in all states-regardless of party controlproposed legislation as a way to signal that they cared about this issue. Of those introduced, 497 were eventually enacted.
Policy Approaches to Address Opioids
Opioid-related legislation was divided into ten different categories (see table 2 ). Across all opioid-related policy types, more than half of the states introduced legislation. Every state introduced legislation that would raise awareness about opioid use and the opioid epidemic. "Raising Awareness" was also the most frequent approach to be enacted in state legislatures with 43 states enacting this type of legislation. Because the fiscal impact of this type of legislation is relatively less costly ($131,000 on average) compared to the other legislative options proposed and enacted, this emphasis by state policy makers is not surprising (see table 3 ). Although some states mandated school curricula to address opioid use and misuse in secondary and/or higher education, it was common to raise awareness through less intensive efforts, either by declaring a pain awareness or prescription pill awareness day or week within the state, which are obviously relatively inexpensive options.
All states introduced and the majority (41) enacted more intensive legislation to establish prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs), which mandate the collection and analysis of opioid prescription utilization data. This is noteworthy because the PDMP approach is organizationally complex and costly ($330,000 on average) relative to the other approaches enacted. Legislation that would increase access to naloxone for either the general public or first responders was also common, with 46 states introducing and 41 enacting such legislation. These measures also often involved more substantial fiscal commitment and government action relative to other options.
Partisan Voting Patterns within States
An analysis of the voting patterns on proposed and enacted legislation addressing opioids highlights largely bipartisan support at the state level. Overall, 96% of votes by Democrats and Republicans across all the states were in support of some type of opioid legislation. The level of support by the type of legislation is also very similar for enacted legislation (see table  2 ). For legislation that was not enacted, only nonmedication prevention approaches dipped below 90% of support by Republicans, who were more likely to oppose compared to their Democratic counterparts. Nonmedication prevention approaches focus on politically controversial opioid prevention strategies like needle exchanges, safe injection sites, and (less controversially) drug take-back programs. Although we observe bipartisan support for proposed and enacted legislation, it is important to note that the policies that make it onto the political agenda are subject to the "mobilization of bias" that E. E. Schattschneider ([1960] 1975) famously describes. Although we did not collect data on the agenda-making process, it is almost certainly the case that particular policy proposals were denied access to the legislative agenda because they were perceived as too costly, such as any policy providing OUD treatment, or too partisan, such as any proposal related to the ACA, making passage unlikely (see also Bachrach and Baratz 1962) . As Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman's (1990) foundational study of the role of money in politics illustrates, focusing on floor votes occludes a great deal of politics that occurs behind the scenes. They find that committee bargaining is the real driver in terms of influencing what ends up in legislation, and all this happens prior to bills arriving on the floor for a vote. Some states with total Republican Party control have openly rejected the Medicaid expansion and yet face significant public pressure to address the opioid epidemic. Do these states pass legislation that is different in content or fiscal commitment from Democrat-led states that have passed the Medicaid expansion? Although Republican-led states have actively passed non-Medicaid legislation to address the opioid epidemic, none of the ten major pieces of the legislation offered access to OUD treatment, as is provided through Medicaid expansion. Naloxone is not only an important life-saving emergency treatment but also a stop-gap measure especially when viewed against the recommended OUD treatment package the helps a person move toward recovery.
Fiscal Analysis of Opioid Policies
Not surprisingly, the average fiscal impact across the states for different policy approaches varied quite substantially: ranging from a low of about $11,000 for regulating prescriptions, which primarily entails data reporting requirements, to a high of $2,000,000 for regulating pain management clinics (see table 3 ). To control for the fact that appropriations will naturally be higher in larger, more prosperous states (i.e., New York and California), we calculated the per capita fiscal impact and the percent of the fiscal impact based on total state appropriations. These measures reveal that regulating PDMPs is not only one of the most frequently enacted legislative approaches to address the opioid epidemic but also the second most costly (see table 3 ).
State Party Control by Legislative Type and Fiscal Impact
States with total party control were more likely to enact opioid-related legislation than states with divided partisan control (see table 4 ). However, there is little difference between total Republican-and total Democratcontrolled states in the most frequent legislative approaches -PDMP, increasing naloxone access, and raising awareness are similarly the three most popular approaches across party control. It is noteworthy, given Republican's distrustful rhetorical regarding government regulation, that it is much more common in Republican-controlled states to enact regulating immunity laws than it is in Democratic-controlled states (71% compared to 36%). 2 However, Democrat-controlled states are more likely to enact legislation that provides nonmedication prevention and that regulates insurance products.
The average fiscal impact of opioid-related legislation in Republicancontrolled states is substantially less than in Democratic-controlled states (see table 5a ). Overall, Republican-controlled states spent about $95,000 on average for opioid-related legislation compared to about $278,000 in Democratic controlled states.
States are constrained by many factors and histories independent of opioid-specific concerns. States' fiscal policies are shaped by path dependencies such that the amount of revenue available to them is the result of past taxation policies, the strength of the state's economy, and spending on other issues. Consequently, the decisions that set a state down a certain fiscal policy path may have been made under a government whose partisan makeup differed from the present configuration. The vast majority of the total Republican-controlled states have been controlled by the Republican Party for a long time: 9 states have been under total Republican control for the last 10 years, and an additional 12 have at least been under Republican legislative (Senate and House) control while having a Republican governor for the entire 10-year period. Thus, these states might have been constrained by past Republican Party decisions in their state, but not by the Democratic Party. Nonetheless, it is certainly the case that states are constrained by the strength of their economy; obviously, it is difficult to have a high-tax effort when the revenue base is low. Moreover, less-populous states may spend less because they have different needs or more limited OUD treatment infrastructures. For these reasons, we calculate per capita fiscal impact to adjust for population size across the states, and percent of total appropriations spent to compare what states spend on opioid legislation relative to the total base of their commitments. When we focus on these measures, we find the same average per capita fiscal commitment for all opioid legislation across states with different party control (see first column in table 5b). However, when we look at percent of total appropriations, states under total Republican control devote a higher proportion of their state spending to opioid-related legislation than states under total Democrat control (see table 5c ).
As we look across both measures, Republican-controlled states spend more per capita and devote more of their resources on the following six legislative approaches: regulating pain management clinics, regulating legal system and opioids, regulating immunity laws, regulating prescriptions, nonmedication prevention approaches, and regulating insurance products (see tables 5b and 5c).
In sum, it is noteworthy that Republican-controlled states are active in using state government to address the opioid epidemic-over 50% of these states enacted 6 of the 10 legislative approaches, and devoted a higher proportion of their own public resources to these opioid-related initiatives.
It is equally important to note what these states did not do: none of the 10 legislative approaches provide access to OUD treatment. The lack of extending government support for access to OUD treatment has consequences. Uninsured adults with OUD are much less likely than someone with private insurance or Medicaid coverage to receive treatment (Wu, Zhu, and Swartz 2016) . Low-income uninsured adults in states that have not expanded Medicaid-all Republican-controlled states-are less likely to gain coverage and access to affordable treatment for OUD and overdose (Clemans-Cope et al. 2019) . In contrast, coverage of medications for OUD, considered necessary for recovery, has been growing in expansion states (Miller 2018; SAMHSA 2018) .
For states that adopt the Medicaid expansion and provide OUD medications, the financial commitment is enormous. Because the number of prescriptions for OUD in expansion states far exceeds nonexpansion states (e.g., 170 prescriptions per 1,000 Medicaid enrollees for buprenorphine in late-expansion states compared to 30 in nonexpansion states), the difference in spending is substantial. For buprenorphine alone, expansion states spent $607 million in 2017 compared to $80 million in nonexpansion states. Comparing spending on state opioid-related legislative actions to that spent on just one OUD medication (this does not include all the other treatments listed in table 1) illustrates the symbolic politics behind the Republican-led state-level legislative approach.
Conclusion: Republican Policies for Addressing the Opioid Epidemic-Active but Meager
Republican opposition to the Medicaid expansion and the ACA has been deep and persistent. Moreover, the unwillingness of most states under total Republican control to pull the biggest lever-adopting the Medicaid expansion-means that even when these states attempt to maximize federal revenue in their regular Medicaid programs to address the opioid epidemic, the amount of federal funding they can ultimately draw down for OUD treatment was (and continues to be) quite modest in comparison to those states that have expanded. In 2017, nearly 20 million people with OUD needed medication-assisted treatment. The vast majority did not receive it, many because they couldn't afford it (Gebelhoff 2018) . Given that many of those directly affected by the opioid epidemic live in areas of dominant Republican Party control and sometimes reflect core Republican constituencies, why aren't those who are not obtaining treatment holding the party responsible?
Time will tell, but it appears for now that the Republican strategy of embracing a conservative welfare state, which includes targeted expansion and retrenchment at the state-level, has been an effective strategy to avoid blame and serve key stakeholders.
Many of these state-level initiatives are valuable reforms. Republican officeholders will surely cite them in their campaigns to demonstrate that the GOP is still capable of working across the aisle and passing major legislation. Yet, the details behind state-level initiatives puncture illusions of bipartisanship in a public health emergency. Medications and outpatient services are necessary, evidence-based treatment services to address OUD (NIDA 2016). Although Republican nonexpansion strategies might work politically, these fail to address a raging epidemic, leaving many Americans without access to life-saving treatment. 
